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Beyond Equal
From Same but Different to the Doctrine of Substantial 
Equivalence
John Paull1
A same-but-different dichotomy has recently been encapsulated within the ill-defined 
concept of “substantial equivalence”. By invoking this concept the genetically modified 
organism (GMO) industry has escaped the rigors of safety testing that might otherwise 
apply. 
The curious concept of “substantial equivalence” grants a presumption of safety to GMO 
food. This presumption has yet to be earned,  and has been used to constrain labelling of 
both GMO and non-GMO food. It is an idea that well serves corporatism. It enables the 
claim of difference to secure patent protection, while upholding the contrary claim of 
sameness to avoid labelling and safety scrutiny. It offers the best of both worlds for 
corporate food entrepreneurs, and delivers the worst of both worlds to consumers.
The term “substantial equivalence” has established its currency within the GMO discourse. 
As the opportunities for patenting food technologies expand, the GMO recruitment of this 
concept will likely be a dress rehearsal for the developing debates on the labelling and 
testing of other techno-foods - including nano-foods and clone-foods.
“Substantial equivalence”
“Are the Seven Commandments the same as they used to be, Benjamin?” asks Clover in 
George Orwell’s “Animal Farm”. By way of response, Benjamin “read out to her what was 
written on the wall. There was nothing there now except a single Commandment. It ran: 
ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT  SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN 
OTHERS”. After this reductionist revelation, further novel and curious events at Manor 
Farm, “did not seem strange” (Orwell, 1945, ch. X). 
Equality is a concept at the very core of mathematics; but beyond the domain of logic, 
equality becomes a hotly contested notion - and the domain of food is no exception. A 
novel food has a regulatory advantage if it can claim to be the same as an established food - 
a food that has proven its worth over centuries, perhaps even millennia - and thus does not 
trigger new, perhaps costly and onerous, testing,  compliance, and even new and 
burdensome regulations. On the other hand, such a novel food has an intellectual property 
(IP) advantage only in terms of its difference. And thus there is an entrenched dissonance 
for newly technologised foods, between claiming sameness, and claiming difference.
The same/different dilemma is erased, so some would have it, by appeal to the curious new 
dualist doctrine of “substantial equivalence” whereby sameness and difference are claimed 
simultaneously, thereby creating a win/win for corporatism, and a loss/loss for 
consumerism.
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This ground has been pioneered, and to some extent conquered, by the GMO industry. The 
conquest has ramifications for other cryptic food technologies, that is technologies that are 
invisible to the consumer and that are not evident to the consumer other than via labelling. 
Cryptic technologies pertaining to food include GMOs, pesticides, hormone treatments, 
irradiation and, most recently, manufactured nano-particles introduced into the food 
production and delivery stream.
Genetic modification of plants was reported as early as 1984 by Horsch et al. The case of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty resulted in a US Supreme Court decision that upheld the prior 
decision of the US Court of Customs and Patent Appeal that “the fact that micro-organisms 
are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law”, and ruled that the 
“respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter”. This was a 
majority decision of nine judges, with four judges dissenting (Burger, 1980). It was this 
Chakrabarty judgement that has seriously opened the Pandora’s box of GMOs because 
patenting rights makes GMOs an attractive corporate proposition by offering potentially 
unique monopoly rights over food.
The rear guard action against GMOs has most often focussed on health repercussions 
(Smith, 2007), food security issues, and also the potential for corporate malfeasance to hide 
behind a cloak of secrecy citing commercial confidentiality (Smith, 2004).  Others have 
tilted at the foundational plank on which the economics of the GMO industry sits: “I 
suggest that the main concern is that we do not want a single molecule of anything we eat 
to contribute to,  or be patented and owned by, a reckless, ruthless chemical 
organisation” (Grist, 2008, 22).
The GMO industry exhibits bipolar behaviour, invoking the concept of “substantial 
difference” to claim patent rights by way of “novelty”, and then claiming “substantial 
equivalence” when dealing with other regulatory authorities including food,  drug and 
pesticide agencies; a case of “having their cake and eating it too” (Engdahl, 2007, 8). This 
is a clever slight-of-rhetoric, laying claim to the best of both worlds for corporations, and 
the worst of both worlds for consumers. Corporations achieve patent protection and no 
concomitant specific regulatory oversight; while consumers pay the cost of patent 
monopolization, and are not necessarily apprised, by way of labelling or otherwise, that 
they are purchasing and eating GMOs, and thereby financing the GMO industry.
The lemma of “substantial equivalence” does not bear close scrutiny. It is a fuzzy concept 
that lacks a tight testable definition. It is exactly this fuzziness that allows lots of wriggle 
room to keep GMOs out of rigorous testing regimes. Millstone et al.  (1999, 526) argue that 
“Substantial equivalence is a pseudo-scientific concept because it is a commercial and 
political judgement masquerading as if it is scientific. It is moreover, inherently anti-
scientific because it was created primarily to provide an excuse for not requiring 
biochemical or toxicological tests. It therefore serves to discourage and inhibit informative 
scientific research”. “Substantial equivalence” grants GMOs the benefit of the doubt 
regarding safety, and thereby leaves unexamined the ramifications for human consumer 
health, for farm labourer and food-processor health, for the welfare of farm animals fed a 
diet of GMO grain,  and for the well-being of the ecosystem, both in general and in its 
particularities.
“Substantial equivalence” was introduced into the food discourse by an Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1993) report: “Safety Evaluation of 
Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology: Concepts and Principles”. It is from this 
document that the ongoing mantra of assumed safety of GMOs derives: “Modern 
biotechnology … does not inherently lead to foods that are less safe … Therefore 
evaluation of foods and food components obtained from organisms developed by the 
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application of the newer techniques does not necessitate a fundamental change in 
established principles,  nor does it require a different standard of safety” (OECD, 1993, 10). 
This was at the time, and remains, an act of faith, a pro-corporatist and a postcautionary 
approach. The OECD motto reveals where their priorities lay: “For a better world 
economy” (OECD, 2008). The term “substantial equivalence” was preceded by the 1992 
USFDA concept of “substantial similarity” (Levidow, Murphy and Carr, 2007) and was 
“borrowed” from a prior usage by the US Food and Drug Agency (USFDA) where it was 
used pertaining to medical devices (Miller, 1999, 1042). 
Even GMO proponents accept that “Substantial equivalence is not intended to be a 
scientific formulation; it is a conceptual tool for food producers and government 
regulators” (Miller, 1999, 1043). And there’s the rub - there is no scientific definition of 
“substantial equivalence”, no scientific test of proof of concept, and nor is there likely to 
be, since this is a ‘spinmeister’  term. And yet this is the cornerstone on which rests the 
presumption of safety of GMOs. Absence of evidence is taken to be evidence of absence. 
History suggests that this is a fraught presumption. By way of contrast, the patenting of 
GMOs depends on the antithesis of assumed ‘sameness’. Patenting rests on proven, 
scrutinised, challengeable and robust tests of difference and novelty. Lightfoot et al. (2000, 
1) report that transgenic plants exhibit “unexpected changes [that] challenge the usual 
assumptions of GMO equivalence and suggest genomic, proteomic and metanomic 
characterization of transgenics is advisable”.
GMO Milk and Contested Labelling
Pesticide company Monsanto markets the genetically engineered hormone rBST 
(recombinant Bovine Somatotropin; also known as: rbST; rBGH, recombinant Bovine 
Growth Hormone; and the brand name Prosilac) to dairy farmers who inject it into their 
cows to increase milk production. This product is not approved for use in many 
jurisdictions, including Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan. Even 
Monsanto accepts that rBST leads to mastitis (inflammation and pus in the udder) and other 
“cow health problems”, however, it maintains that “these problems did not occur at rates 
that would prohibit the use of Prosilac” (Monsanto, 2007).  A European Union study 
identified an extensive list of health concerns of rBST  use (European Commission, 1999). 
The US Dairy Export Council however entertain no doubt. In their background document 
they ask “is milk from cows treated with rBST safe?” and answer “Absolutely” (USDEC, 
2006). Meanwhile,  Monsanto’s website raises, and answers, the question: “Is the milk from 
cows treated with rbST any different from milk from untreated cows? No” (Monsanto, 
2007). Injecting cows with genetically modified hormones to boost their milk production 
remains a contested practice, banned in many countries.
It is the claimed equivalence that has kept consumers of US dairy products in the dark, 
shielded rBST dairy farmers from having to declare that their milk production is GMO-
enhanced, and has inhibited non-GMO producers from declaring their milk as non-GMO, 
non rBST, or not hormone enhanced. This is a battle that has simmered, and sometimes 
raged, for a decade in the US. Finally there is a modest victory for consumers: the 
Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (PDA) requires all labels used on milk products to 
be approved in advance by the department. The standard issued in October 2007 (PDA, 
2007) signalled to producers that any milk labels claiming rBST-free status would be 
rejected. This advice was rescinded in January 2008 with new, specific, department-
approved textual constructions allowed, and ensuring that any “no rBST” style claim was 
paired with a PDA-prescribed disclaimer (PDA, 2008).
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However, parsimonious labelling is prohibited:
No labeling may contain references such as ‘No Hormones’, ‘Hormone Free’, ‘Free 
of Hormones’, ‘No BST’, ‘Free of BST’, ‘BST Free’,’No added BST’, or any 
statement which indicates, implies or could be construed to mean that no natural 
bovine somatotropin (BST) or synthetic bovine somatotropin (rBST) are contained in 
or added to the product (PDA, 2008, 3).
Difference claims are prohibited:
 In no instance shall any label state or imply that milk from cows not treated with
recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST, rbST,  RBST or rbst) differs in composition 
from milk or products made with milk from treated cows, or that rBST is not 
contained in or added to the product. If a product is represented as, or intended to 
be represented to consumers as, containing or produced from milk from cows not 
treated with rBST any labeling information must convey only a difference in farming 
practices or dairy herd management methods (PDA, 2008, 3).
The PDA-approved labelling text for non-GMO dairy farmers is specified as follows:
 ‘From cows not treated with rBST. No significant difference has been shown
between milk derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST-treated cows’ or a substantial 
equivalent.  Hereinafter, the first sentence shall be referred to as the ‘Claim’, and the 
second sentence shall be referred to as the ‘Disclaimer’ (PDA, 2008, 4).
It is onto the non-GMO dairy farmer alone, that the costs of compliance fall. These costs 
include label preparation and approval, proving non-usage of GMOs, and of creating and 
maintaining an audit trail.
In nearby Ohio a similar consumer versus corporatist pantomime is playing out. This time 
with the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) calling the shots, and again serving the 
GMO industry. The ODA prescribed text allowed to non-GMO dairy farmers is “from cows 
not supplemented with rbST” and this is to be conjoined with the mandatory disclaimer “no 
significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and 
non-rbST supplemented cows” (Curet, 2008). These are “emergency rules”: they apply for 
90 days, and are proposed as permanent. Once again,  the onus is on the non-GMO dairy 
farmers to document and prove their claims. GMO dairy farmers face no such 
governmental requirements, including no disclosure requirement, and thus an asymmetric 
regulatory impost is placed on the non-GMO farmer which opens up new opportunities for 
administrative demands and technocratic harassment.
Levidow et al. (2007) argue,  somewhat Eurocentrically, that from its 1990s adoption “as 
the basis for a harmonized science-based approach to risk assessment” (26) the concept of 
“substantial equivalence” has “been recast in at least three ways” (58).  It is true that the 
GMO debate has evolved differently in the US and Europe, and with other jurisdictions 
usually adopting intermediate positions, yet the concept persists. Levidow et al. nominate 
their three recastings as: firstly an “implicit redefinition” by the appending of “extra 
phrases in official documents”; secondly, “it has been reinterpreted, as risk assessment 
processes have … required more evidence of safety than before, especially in Europe”; and 
thirdly, “it has been demoted in the European Union regulatory procedures so that it can no 
longer be used to justify the claim that a risk assessment is unnecessary” (58).
Romeis et al. (2008) have proposed a decision tree approach to GMO risks based on 
cascading tiers of risk assessment. However what remains is that the defects of the concept 
of “substantial equivalence” persist. Schauzu identified that: such decisions are a matter of 
“opinion”; that there is “no clear definition of the term ‘substantial’”; that because genetic 
modification “is aimed at introducing new traits into organisms,  the result will always be a 
different combination of genes and proteins”; and that “there is no general checklist that 
M/C Journal 11(2) May 2008                                      <journal.media-culture.org.au> 
preprint version                                                       4                                                                              
could be followed by those who are responsible for allowing a product to be placed on the 
market” (2).
Benchmark for Further Food Novelties?
The discourse, contestation, and debate about “substantial equivalence” have largely 
focussed on the introduction of GMOs into food production processes. GM can best be 
regarded as the test case, and proof of concept,  for establishing “substantial equivalence” as 
a benchmark for evaluating new and forthcoming food technologies. This is of concern, 
because the concept of “substantial equivalence” is scientific hokum, and yet its 
persistence, even entrenchment,  within regulatory agencies may be a harbinger of 
forthcoming same-but-different debates for nanotechnology and other future 
bioengineering. 
The appeal of “substantial equivalence” has been a brake on the creation of GMO-specific 
regulations and on rigorous GMO testing. The food nanotechnology industry can be 
expected to look to the precedent of the GMO debate to head off specific nano-regulations 
and nano-testing. As cloning becomes economically viable, then this may be another wave 
of food innovation that muddies the regulatory waters with the confused - and ultimately 
self-contradictory - concept of “substantial equivalence”. 
Nanotechnology engineers particles in the size range 1 to 100 nanometres - a nanometre is 
one billionth of a metre. This is interesting for manufacturers because at this size chemicals 
behave differently, or as the Australian Office of Nanotechnology expresses it, “new 
functionalities are obtained” (AON, 2007).  Globally, government expenditure on 
nanotechnology research reached US$4.6 billion in 2006 (Roco,  2007, 3.12). While there 
are now many patents (ETC Group,  2004; Roco, 2007), regulation specific to nanoparticles 
is lacking (Bowman and Hodge, 2007; Miller and Senjen, 2008). The USFDA (2008) 
advises that nano-manufacturers “must show a reasonable assurance of safety … or 
substantial equivalence”.
A recent inventory of nano-products already on the market identified 580 products.  Of these 
11.4% were categorised as “Food and Beverage” (WWICS, 2007). This is at a time when 
public confidence in regulatory bodies is declining (HRA, 2007). In an Australian 
consumer survey on nanotechnology, 65% of respondents indicated they were concerned 
about “unknown and long term side effects”, and 71% agreed that it is important “to know 
if products are made with nanotechnology” (MARS, 2007, 22). 
Cloned animals are currently more expensive to produce than traditional animal progeny. In 
the course of 678 pages, the USFDA (2006) “Animal Cloning: A Draft Risk Assessment” 
has not a single mention of “substantial equivalence”. However the Federation of Animal 
Science Societies (FASS) in its single page “Statement in support of USFDA’s risk 
assessment conclusion that food from cloned animals is safe for human consumption” 
states that “FASS endorses the use of this comparative evaluation process as the foundation 
of establishing substantial equivalence of any food being evaluated. It must be emphasized 
that it is the food product itself that should be the focus of the evaluation rather than the 
technology used to generate cloned animals” (FASS, 2008, 1). 
Contrary to the FASS derogation of the importance of process in food production,  for 
consumers both the process and provenance of production is an important and integral 
aspect of a food product’s value and identity.  Some consumers will legitimately insist that 
their Kalamata olives are from Greece, or their balsamic vinegar is from Modena. It was the 
British public’s growing awareness that their sugar was being produced by slave labour that 
enabled the boycotting of the product, and ultimately the outlawing of slavery (Hochschild, 
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2006). When consumers boycott Nestle, because of past or present marketing practices, or 
boycott produce of USA because of, for example, US foreign policy or animal welfare 
concerns,  they are distinguishing the food based on the narrative of the food, the production 
process and/or production context which are a part of the identity of the food. Consumers 
attribute value to food based on production process and provenance information (Paull, 
2006). Products produced by slave labour, by child labour, by political prisoners,  by means 
of torture, theft, immoral, unethical or unsustainable practices are different from their 
alternatives. The process of production is a part of the identity of a product and consumers 
are increasingly interested in food narrative. It requires vigilance to ensure that these 
narratives are delivered with the product to the consumer, and are neither lost nor 
suppressed.
Throughout the GM debate, the organic sector has successfully skirted the “substantial 
equivalence” debate by excluding GMOs from the certified organic food production 
process. This GMO-exclusion from the organic food stream is the one reprieve available to 
consumers worldwide who are keen to avoid GMOs in their diet. The organic industry 
carries the expectation of providing food produced without artificial pesticides and 
fertilizers, and by extension, without GMOs. Most recently, the Soil Association, the 
leading organic certifier in the UK, claims to be the first organisation in the world to 
exclude manufactured nonoparticles from their products (Soil Association, 2008). There has 
been the call that engineered nanoparticles be excluded from organic standards worldwide, 
given that there is no mandatory safety testing and no compulsory labelling in place (Paull 
& Lyons, in press). 
The twisted rhetoric of oxymorons does not make the ideal foundation for policy. Setting 
food policy on the shifting sands of “substantial equivalence” seems foolhardy when we 
consider the potentially profound ramifications of globally mass marketing a dysfunctional 
food. There is a 2x2 matrix of terms - “substantial equivalence”, substantial difference, 
insubstantial equivalence, insubstantial difference - and while only one corner of this 
matrix is engaged for food policy, and while the elements remain matters of opinion rather 
than being testable by science, or by some other regime, then the public is the dupe, and 
potentially the victim. “Substantial equivalence” has served the GMO corporates well and 
the public poorly, and this asymmetry is slated to escalate if nano-food and clone-food are 
also folded into the “substantial equivalence” paradigm. Only in Orwellian Newspeak is 
war peace, or is same different. It is time to jettison the pseudo-scientific doctrine of 
“substantial equivalence”, as a convenient oxymoron, and embrace full disclosure of 
provenance, process and difference, so that consumers are not collateral in a continuing 
asymmetric knowledge war.
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